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Abstracts 
Paper 1: Thanks but No Thanks: A New Policy to Reduce Land Conflict 
Land conflicts in developing countries are costly. An important policy goal is to create respect for borders. This often 
involves mandatory, expensive interventions. We propose a new policy design which in theory promotes neighborly 
relations at low cost. A salient feature is the option to by-pass regulation through consensus. The key idea combines the 
insight that social preferences transform social dilemmas into coordination problems with the logic of forward induction. As 
a first, low-cost pass at empirical evaluation, we conduct an experiment among farmers in the Ethiopian highlands, a region 
exhibiting features typical of countries where borders are often disputed. 
Paper 2: Experimentation and Social Learning in Small-Scale Agriculture: A Tale of Two Dilemmas 
In situations where critical information about new technologies comes from costly experimentation, social learning 
possibilities create incentives for free-riding. I explore this problem in the context of technology adoption in small-scale 
agriculture. First, I show that a multistage volunteer’s dilemma game arises if experimentation is not divisible and hence 
should be carried out by a single agent. If experimentation is divisible, the problem becomes a multistage threshold public 
good game. I then undertake lab experiments to evaluate the net effect of social learning in each game and compare the 
outcomes. I find that losses from delay in experimentation outweigh efficiency gains from social learning when 
experimentation is not divisible. On the other hand, efficiency gains from social learning outweigh delay costs when it is 
possible to share the burden of experimentation. The potential role of social preferences is discussed at the end. 
Paper 3: Does Positional Concern Matter in Poor Societies? Evidence from a Survey Experiment in Rural Ethiopia 
We investigate attitudes toward positionality among rural farmers in Northern Ethiopia using a survey experiment. On 
average, we find very low positional concerns both for income per se and for income from aid projects. The results support 
the claim that positional concerns are positively correlated with absolute level of income. The implications of our results on 
implementation of aid projects are discussed. 
Paper 4: Positional Concerns among the Poor: Does Reference Group Matter? Evidence from Survey Experiments 
Previous research on positional concerns suggests a lower degree of positional concerns among people from poor countries. 
We test if low positional concerns found in the literature may be due to misspecification of the reference groups. We 
contribute to the limited literature by estimating the positional concerns in a low-income country considering various 
reference groups. We do so by testing the effect of different reference groups on the positional concerns of a representative 
sample of individuals in urban Ethiopia. We use a tailored survey experiment that is modified to include multiplicity of 
reference groups. The results show a low degree of positional concern for income, and that the degree of positional concern 
is highly stable across different reference groups. 
Paper 5: Attitudes toward Uncertainty among the Poor: an Experiment in Rural Ethiopia 
We investigate risk and ambiguity attitudes among Ethiopian farmers in one of the poorest regions of the world. Strong risk 
aversion and ambiguity aversion were found with the Ethiopian farmers. We compared their attitudes to those of a Western 
university student sample elicited by the same decision task. Ambiguity aversion was similar for farmers and students, but 
farmers were more risk averse. Our results show that ambiguity aversion is not restricted to Western student populations, 
and that studies of agricultural decisions may bene.t from explicitly considering ambiguity attitudes. 
Paper 6: Preferences toward Efficiency and Pro-Sociality: A Comparison across Subject Pools 
Mixed experimental results on how social preference motivations fare against efficiency concerns have raised important 
issues related to representativeness of different subject pools, especially with the divergence of results between economics 
students and others. This paper extends the experimental investigation to non-Western subjects. We perform experiments 
that were conducted with Western subjects in earlier studies, but we use Ethiopian university students and small-scale 
farmers as subjects. Our results show that Ethiopian farmers behave similarly to non-economics students and non-students 
in Western countries, while Ethiopian economics students behave similarly to economics students in Western countries. 
Paper 7: Cooperative Preferences in Teams 
This paper experimentally examines the effect of team decision-making on cooperative behavior by using a public goods 
experiment. We find that teams are more likely than individuals to be free-riders, in line with other empirical findings 
showing that teams are more sel.sh. We also find that individuals learn free-riding from their team decision experience. 
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